



## ***Inadvertent Activation of Critical BOP Function Results in Subsea Release***

### **What happened?**

A subsea employee inadvertently pushed the Riser Connector Unlock button instead of the Pilot Operated Check Valve (POCV) override button on the BOP panel. The unintended pushing of the Riser Connector Unlock button caused the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) to disconnect from the BOP causing a Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) of 350 barrels of 10.4 ppg of Calcium Chloride into the sea.

### **What went wrong?**

Subsea was preparing the BOP panel controls for a planned "offline" choke and kill manifold testing and observed pressure had risen to 1,850 psi when the high status was set at 1,750 psi. The subsea employee lifted a protective cover to push the POCV button to release the excess pressure, but pushed the wrong button.

### **Why did it happen?**

- A non-critical function (POCV button) was linked with a critical function (LMRP connector button) under the same protective cover. Once this cover was raised, this allowed the opportunity for the inadvertent activation of the LMRP connector button.
- The process of equalizing pressure across the POCV is not documented in any work instruction or policy because it is not a daily operation.
- Subsea employee lost focus on the task, and did not verify the correct button before activating the function from the BOP panel.

### **What areas were identified for improvement?**

- Protective covers are intended to prevent inadvertent activation of the buttons they cover. A single protective cover should not cover both critical and non-critical functions.
- Review critical BOP control panels and design layouts to prevent confusion of critical vs non-critical functions.
- Review Sub Sea Ops Manuals, as necessary, to ensure that procedures adequately address safeguards preventing inadvertent activation of critical functions under a protective cover.

## ***What will WE do to prevent this from happening HERE?***

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